Corporate stress and bank nonperforming loans: Evidence from Pakistan

Ali Choudhary and Anil K. Jain
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Anil K. Jain: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/anil-k-jain.htm

No 1327, International Finance Discussion Papers from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: Using detailed administrative Pakistani credit registry data, we show that banks with low leverage ratios are both significantly slower and less likely to recognize a loan as nonperforming than other banks that lend to the same firm. Moreover, we find suggestive evidence that this lack of recognition impedes loan curing, with banks with low leverage ratios reporting significantly higher final default rates than other banks for the same borrower (even after controlling for differences in loan terms). Our empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that classifying a nonperforming loan is more expensive for banks with less capital.

Keywords: Credit markets; Banks; Corporate debt; Evergreening; nonperforming loans (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-08-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cfn, nep-fdg and nep-isf
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Corporate stress and bank nonperforming loans: Evidence from Pakistan (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgif:1327

DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2021.1327

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