Red ink in the rearview mirror: local fiscal conditions and the issuance of traffic tickets

Thomas Garrett and Gary A. Wagner

No 2006-048, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: Municipalities have revenue motives for enforcing traffic laws in addition to public safety motives because many traffic offenses are punished via fines and the issuing municipality often retains the revenue. Anecdotal evidence supports this revenue motive. We empirically test this revenue motive using panel data on North Carolina counties. We find that significantly more tickets are issued in the year following a decline in revenue, but the issuance of traffic tickets does not decline in years following revenue increases. Our results suggest that tickets are used as a revenue generation tool rather than solely a means to increase public safety. ; Formerly titled: Are traffic tickets countercyclical?

Keywords: Local; government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Related works:
Journal Article: Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets (2009)
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2006.048

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