Conflict, evolution, hegemony, and the power of the state

David Levine and Salvatore Modica ()

No 2013-023, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their ?exclusiveness? we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently ?extractive? in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.

Keywords: Game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State (2013)
Working Paper: Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State (2013)
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2013.023

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