Banker Preferences, Interbank Connections, and the Enduring Structure of the Federal Reserve System

Matthew Jaremski and David Wheelock

No 2015-11, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: Established by a three person committee in 1914, the structure of the Federal Reserve System has remained essentially unchanged ever since, despite criticism at the time and over ensuing decades. This paper examines the original selection of cities for Reserve Banks and branches, and placement of district boundaries. We show that each aspect of the Fed?s structure reflected the preferences of national banks, including adjustments to district boundaries after 1914. Further, using newly-collected data on interbank connections, we find that banker preferences mirrored established correspondent relationships. The Federal Reserve was thus formed on top of the structure that it was largely meant to replace.

Keywords: Federal Reserve System; Federal Reserve Banks; Reserve Bank Organization Committee; interbank networks; correspondent banking. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 N21 N22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2015-06-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-his, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Banker Preferences, Interbank Connections, and the Enduring Structure of the Federal Reserve System (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2015-011

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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2015.011

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