Voluntary participation in a terror group and counterterrorism policy

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Todd Sandler

No 2022-023, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: A three-stage game investigates how counterterrorism measures are affected by volunteers’ choice in joining a terrorist group. In stage 1, the government chooses both proactive and defensive countermeasures, while looking ahead to the anticipated size and actions of terrorist groups. After radicalized individuals choose whether to join a terrorist group in stage 2, group members then allocate their time between work and terrorist operations. Based on wages and government counterterrorism, the game characterizes the extensive margin determining group size and the intensive margin indicating the group’s level of attacks. Comparative statics show how changes in wages or radicalization impact the optimal mix between defensive and proactive countermeasures. Higher (lower) wages favor a larger (smaller) mix of proactive measures over defensive actions. In the absence of backlash, enhanced radicalization of terrorist members calls for a greater reliance on defensive actions. The influence of backlash on counterterrorism is also examined.

Keywords: terrorist supporters' occupational choice; rational terrorist supply; radicalization and wage rate; optimal mix between proactive and defensive countermeasures; backlash (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: Publisher DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.031
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Journal Article: Voluntary participation in a terror group and counterterrorism policy (2023)
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DOI: 10.20955/wp.2022.023

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