The Interaction and Sequencing of Policy Reforms
Jose Asturias,
Sewon Hur,
Timothy Kehoe and
Kim Ruhl
No 521, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Abstract:
In what order should a developing country adopt policy reforms? Do some policies complement each other? Do others substitute for each other? To address these questions, we develop a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with entry and exit of firms that are monopolistic competitors. Distortions in the model include barriers to entry of firms, barriers to international trade, and barriers to contract enforcement. We find that a reform that reduces one of these distortions has different effects depending on the other distortions present. In particular, reforms to trade barriers and barriers to the entry of new firms are substitutable, as are reforms to contract enforcement and trade barriers. In contrast, reforms to contract enforcement and the barriers to entry are complementary. Finally, the optimal sequencing of reforms requires reforming trade barriers before contract enforcement.
Keywords: Sequencing reforms; Contract enforcement; Trade barriers; Entry barriers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F4 O11 O19 O24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2015-11-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-dge
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
Downloads: (external link)
https://minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr521.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The interaction and sequencing of policy reforms (2016) 
Working Paper: The Interaction and Sequencing of Policy Reforms (2016) 
Working Paper: The Interaction and Sequencing of Policy Reforms (2016) 
Working Paper: The Interaction and Sequencing of Policy Reforms (2015) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:521
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kate Hansel ().