A Welfare Analysis of Occupational Licensing in U.S. States

Morris M. Kleiner and Evan J. Soltas

No 590, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: We assess the welfare consequences of occupational licensing for workers and consumers. We estimate a model of labor market equilibrium in which licensing restricts labor supply but also affects labor demand via worker quality and selection. On the margin of occupations licensed differently between U.S. states, we find that licensing raises wages and hours but reduces employment. We estimate an average welfare loss of 12 percent of occupational surplus. Workers and consumers respectively bear 70 and 30 percent of the incidence. Higher willingness to pay offsets 80 percent of higher prices for consumers, and higher wages compensate workers for 60 percent of the cost of mandated investment in occupation-specific human capital.

Keywords: Occupational licensing; Labor supply; Human capital; Welfare analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 J24 J38 J44 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 86
Date: 2019-10-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-law and nep-ltv
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:87569

DOI: 10.21034/sr.590

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