Worker Flows in Banking Regulation

David Lucca, Amit Seru and Francesco Trebbi

No 20150105, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, job transitions of personnel in banking supervision and regulation between the public and private sectors?often labeled the revolving door?have come under intense scrutiny and have been blamed by certain economists (Johnson and Kwak), legal scholars (John Coffee in the Financial Times), and policymakers (Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Section 968) for distorting regulators? actions in favor of banks. However, other commentators have downplayed these distortions and presented a more benign viewpoint of these worker flows?as a means for regulatory agencies to attract higher-ability and skilled workers. Because data on job transitions in banking regulatory agencies are scarce, these discussions are mostly informed by anecdotes. Our recent paper brings more rigor to this debate by contributing a first set of stylized facts based on data related to incidence and drivers of worker flows in U.S. banking regulation. Our data show clear evidence of higher worker inflows to the regulatory sector during bad economic conditions. When we study worker flows as a function of an enforcement proxy, we find evidence to be inconsistent with the often-cited ?quid-pro-quo? hypothesis. We instead posit an alternative ?regulatory schooling? hypothesis that may better explain the empirical evidence.

Keywords: worker flows; Banking regulation; revolving doors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01-05
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