Insider Networks

Selman Erol and Michael Lee

No 20200625, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: Modern-day financial systems are highly complex, with billions of exchanges in information, assets, and funds between individuals and institutions. Though daunting to operationalize, regulating these transmissions may be desirable in some instances. For example, securities regulators aim to protect investors by tracking and punishing insider trading. Recent evidence shows that insiders have formed sophisticated networksthat enable them to pursue activities outside the purview of regulatory oversight. In understanding the cat-and-mouse game between regulators and insiders, a key consideration is the networks that insiders might form in order to circumvent regulation, and how regulators might cope with insiders’ tactics. In this post, we introduce a theoretical framework that considers network formation in response to regulation and review the key insights.

Keywords: insider trading; money laundering; capital controls; transmission networks; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G1 G2 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06-25
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Working Paper: Insider networks (2018)
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