The Adverse Effect of “Mandatory” Flood Insurance on Access to Credit

Kristian Blickle, Katherine Engelman, Theo Linnemann and Joao Santos

No 20220523, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was designed to reduce household and lender flood-risk exposure and encourage lending. In this post, which is based on our related study, we show that in certain situations the program actually limits access to credit, particularly for low-income borrowers—an unintended consequence of this well-intentioned program.

Keywords: flood maps; climate change; bank lending; regulation; unintended consequences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D14 G52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-env and nep-ias
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