Banks Runs and Information

Haelim Anderson () and Adam Copeland
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Haelim Anderson: https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/bios/anderson.html

No 20230512, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank (SB) has raised questions about the fragility of the banking system. One striking aspect of these bank failures is how the runs that preceded them reflect risks and trade-offs that bankers and regulators have grappled with for many years. In this post, we highlight how these banks, with their concentrated and uninsured deposit bases, look quite similar to the small rural banks of the 1930s, before the creation of deposit insurance. We argue that, as with those small banks in the early 1930s, managing the information around SVB and SB’s balance sheets is of first-order importance.

Keywords: bank runs; information management; bank crises; banking crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-his, nep-mon and nep-pke
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