Bank Supervision

Beverly Hirtle and Anna Kovner

No 952, Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: We provide a critical review of the empirical and theoretical literature on bank supervision. The review focuses on microprudential supervision: the supervision of individual banking institutions aimed at assessing the financial and operational health of those firms. Theory suggests that supervision is required both to ensure compliance with regulation but also to allow for the use of soft information in mitigating externalities of bank failure. Empirically, more intensive supervision results in reduced risk-taking, but there is less consensus on whether the risk-reducing impact of supervision comes at the cost of reduced credit supply. Theoretical costs and benefits of supervisory disclosure have been outlined, and this disclosure is informative to investors. However, it is difficult to identify the impact of disclosure distinct from supervisory and regulatory changes.

Keywords: banking; supervision; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2020-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba
Note: Revised December 2021. Previous title: “Banking Supervision: The Perspective from Economics”
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Journal Article: Bank Supervision (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fednsr:89213

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