Monetizing Privacy

Rodney Garratt and Michael Lee

No 958, Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: In a market where consumers choose between payment options and firms compete with products and prices, we show that payment data drives the formation of a market monopoly. A data-sharing policy can successfully restore and maintain a competitive market, but often at the expense of both efficiency and consumer welfare. The introduction of a low-cost anonymous means of electronic payment, or digital cash, preserves the market structure and improves consumers’ welfare by enabling them to monetize their private information. We discuss the potential role of central banks in providing digital cash.

Keywords: customer data; privacy; market structure; digital cash; payments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 L11 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2021-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mac and nep-pay
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