Sticky prices versus monetary frictions: an estimation of policy trade-offs

S. Boragan Aruoba and Frank Schorfheide ()
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Frank Schorfheide: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/people/frank-schorfheide

No 09-8, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Abstract: We develop a two-sector monetary model with a centralized and decentralized market. Activities in the centralized market resemble those in a standard New Keynesian economy with price rigidities. In the decentralized market agents engage in bilateral exchanges for which money is essential. The model is estimated and evaluated based on postwar U.S. data. We document its money demand properties and determine the optimal long-run inflation rate that trades off the New Keynesian distortion against the distortion caused by taxing money and hence transactions in the decentralized market. We find that target rates of -1% or less are desirable, which contrasts with policy recommendations derived from a cashless New Keynesian model.

Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sticky Prices versus Monetary Frictions: An Estimation of Policy Trade-Offs (2011)
Working Paper: Sticky Prices Versus Monetary Frictions: An Estimation of Policy Trade-offs (2009)
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