Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets

Benjamin Lester, Ludo Visschers and Ronald Wolthoff

No 14-15, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Abstract: In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we allow for a general meeting technology and show that its properties crucially affect the mechanism that sellers select in equilibrium. In general, it is optimal for sellers to post an auction without a reserve price but with a fee, paid by all buyers who meet with the seller. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call invariance, and show that meeting fees are equal to zero if and only if this condition is satisfied. Finally, we discuss how invariance is related to other properties of meeting technologies identified in the literature.

Keywords: Search frictions; Matching function; Meeting technology; Competing mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2014-04-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2015)
Working Paper: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Marks (2014)
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014)
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