The Perils of Nominal Targets
Roc Armenter (roc.armenter@phil.frb.org)
No 16-30, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Abstract:
A monetary authority can be committed to pursuing an inflation, price-level, or nominal-GDP target yet systematically fail to achieve the prescribed goal. Con- strained by the zero lower bound on the policy rate, the monetary authority is unable to implement its objectives when private-sector expectations stray far enough from the target. Low-inflation expectations become self-fulfilling, resulting in an additional Markov equilibrium in which the monetary authority falls short of the nominal target, average output is below its efficient level, and the policy rate is typically low. Introducing a stabilization goal for long-term nominal rates can implement a unique Markov equilibrium without fully compromising stabilization policy.
Keywords: inflation targeting; zero lower bound; Markov equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2016-11-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Working Paper: The perils of nominal targets (2013)
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