Are harsh penalties for default really better?

Kartik Athreya, Xuan Tam () and Eric Young

No 09-11, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Abstract: How might society ensure the allocation of credit to those who lack meaningful collateral? Two very different options that have each been pursued by a variety of societies through time and space are (i) relatively harsh penalties for default and, more recently, (ii) loan guarantee programs that allow borrowers to default subject to moderate consequences and use public funds to compensate lenders. The goal of this paper is to provide a quantitative statement about the relative desirability of these responses. Our findings are twofold. First, we show that under a wide array of circumstances, punishments harsh enough to ensure all debt is repaid improve welfare. With respect to loan guarantees, our findings suggest that such efforts are largely useless at best, and substantially harmful at worst. Generous loan guarantees virtually ensure substantially higher taxes ? with transfers away from the non-defaulting poor to the defaulting middle-class ? and greater deadweight loss from high equilibrium default rates. Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that current policy toward default is likely to be counterproductive, and that guarantees for consumption loans are not the answer.

Keywords: Credit; Bankruptcy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mfd and nep-rmg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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