Fixed Prices and Regulatory Discretion as Triggers for Contingent Capital Conversion: An Experimental Examination

Douglas Davis and Edward Prescott

No 15-2, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Abstract: An unresolved issue regarding the implementation of 'contingent capital' bonds regards identifying the best mechanism for triggering the conversion of debt into equity. This paper reports a laboratory experiment that builds on previous work to evaluate the relative desirability of two leading candidate mechanisms: a price informed regulator and a mechanistic fixed-price trigger. We find that the conversion rule in effect determines the desirability of these two mechanisms. When the conversion increases incumbent equity value, a fixed trigger is preferable, but when the conversion decreases value, the reverse holds. Two modifications for improving the regulator mechanism, creating regulator bias (e.g., giving a regulator asymmetric rewards over intervention) and probabilistically providing a regulator with non-market information, only enhance this result.

JEL-codes: C92 G14 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2015-03-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mfd
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Journal Article: Fixed Prices and Regulatory Discretion as Triggers for Contingent Capital Conversion: An Experimental Examination (2017)
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