Monetary mystique: secrecy and central banking

Marvin Goodfriend

No 85-07, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Abstract: The paper contains a theoretical discussion of the role of secrecy in the implementation of monetary policy. It documents the Federal Reserve's defense of secrecy as argued in a recent Freedom of Information Act suit. The Federal Reserve's arguments are evaluated on the basis of economic theory. Theoretical papers related to the secrecy issue are reviewed. The discussion highlights a number of potential benefits and costs of central banking secrecy, and identifies some conditions under which secrecy could be socially beneficial.

Keywords: Monetary policy; Banks and banking, Central (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
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Related works:
Journal Article: Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking (1986)
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