The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts

Pierre Chaigneau ()

FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group

Abstract: We use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by di erent types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by risk averse managers, in a fairly general setting. We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. Thus, prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compen- sation. We also present a condition on the utility function which enables to compare the structure of optimal contracts associated with di erent risk preferences.

Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-upt
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