Framing and Misperceptions in a Public Good Experiment

Toke Reinholt Fosgaard (tf@foi.ku.dk), Lars Gårn Hansen (lgh@foi.ku.dk) and Erik Wengström
Additional contact information
Toke Reinholt Fosgaard: Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
Lars Gårn Hansen: Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 2011/11, IFRO Working Paper from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics

Abstract: Earlier studies have found that a substantial part of the contributions in public good games can be explained by subjects misperceiving the game's incentives. Using a large-scale public good experiment, we show that subtle changes in how the game is framed substantially affect such misperceptions and that this explains major parts of framing effect on subjects' behavior. When controlling for the different levels of misperception between frames, the framing effect on subjects' cooperation preferences disappears.

Keywords: Public goods; Cooperation; Misperception; Framing effects; Internet experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2011-07, Revised 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Framing and Misperception in Public Good Experiments (2017)
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