Instrument Choice when Regulators are Concerned about Resource Extinction

Lars Gårn Hansen (), Frank Jensen () and Clifford Russell
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Lars Gårn Hansen: Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
Clifford Russell: Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME 04011, USA

No 2011/6, IFRO Working Paper from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics

Abstract: In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximising industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2011-02, Revised 2011-07
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http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/WPpdf/WP2011/W ... t_choice_revised.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction (2013)
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