Governance Strategies and Welfare Effects: Vertical Integration and Contracts in the Catfish Sector in Vietnam

Neda Trifkovic

No 2013/20, IFRO Working Paper from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics

Abstract: Using an original dataset from the Vietnamese catfish sector, we study the impact of vertical coordination options on household welfare and the implications of different stages of vertical coordination for the success of the whole sector. The welfare gain from contract farming and employment on processor-owned estate farms is estimated using a maximum simulated likelihood estimator. Our results show positive welfare effects from participating in contract farming, but not from employment on processor-owned estate farms. The results imply that contract farming presents opportunities for economic growth, but additional effort is required to make the contracts more accessible to smallholders.

Keywords: vertical coordination; catfish; maximum simulated likelihood; agri-food transformation; Vietnam (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D31 L14 L24 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-fdg, nep-sea and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/WPpdf/WP2013/IFRO_WP_2013_20.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Governance strategies and welfare effects: vertical integration and contracts in the catfish sector in Vietnam (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2013_20

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IFRO Working Paper from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Geir Tveit ().