Understanding the Nature of Cooperation Variability
Toke Fosgaard (),
Lars Hansen and
Erik Wengström
Additional contact information
Toke Fosgaard: Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
No 2013/4, IFRO Working Paper from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics
Abstract:
We investigate framing effects in a large-scale public good experiment. We measure indicators of explanations previously proposed in the literature, which when combined with the large sample, enable us to estimate a structural model of framing effects. The model captures potential causal effects and the behavioral heterogeneity of cooperation variability. We find that framing only has a small effect on the average level of cooperation but a substantial effect on behavioral heterogeneity and we show that this can be explained almost exclusively by a corresponding change in the heterogeneity of beliefs about other subjects’ behavior. Preferences are on the other hand stable between frames.
Keywords: Framing; Public Goods; Internet Experiment; Simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C13 C71 C93 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2013-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/WPpdf/WP2013/IFRO_WP_2013_4.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Understanding the nature of cooperation variability (2014) 
Working Paper: Understanding the Nature of Cooperation Variability (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2013_4
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