An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption

Angelino Viceisza

No 774, IFPRI discussion papers from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Abstract: "This study reports theory-testing laboratory experiments on the effect of yardstick competition on corruption. The results reveal that on the incumbent's side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism only if the incumbent politician is female. On the voter's side, voters focus on the difference between the tax rate in their own jurisdiction versus that in another jurisdiction. If the voters' tax rate is deemed unfair compared to that in the other jurisdiction, voters are less likely to re-elect. These findings support the claim by Besley and Case (1995) that incumbent behavior and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition, suggesting that our laboratory experiments have some external validity." from Author's Abstract

Keywords: corruption; experimentation; social protection; institutions; politics; taxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com, nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-pbe
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https://hdl.handle.net/10568/160690

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Working Paper: An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fpr:ifprid:774

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