Targeted Vaccine Subsidies for Healthcare Workers
Troy Tassier (),
Phillip Polgreen and
Alberto Segre
Additional contact information
Phillip Polgreen: University of Iowa, Carver College of Medicine, Department of Internal Medicine
Alberto Segre: University of Iowa, Department of Computer Science
Fordham Economics Discussion Paper Series from Fordham University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We study the public goods problem associated with vaccinations. The externality created by an infection is composed of two parts, the probability of infection and the marginal infections generated if infected. We argue that the key component in a successful vaccination strategy is the second of these items but that current public policy focuses on the first. We use a newly collected data set coupled with agent-based simulations to study the spread of influenza and other infectious diseases in hospitals. We estimate the marginal infections created by various worker groups in a hospital in order to prioritize vaccine allocations across different healthcare worker groups in times of vaccine shortages. One primary focus of this paper is identifying the individual hospital workers who are most important to vaccinate. Surprisingly, we find that many groups with patient care responsibilities, such as physicians, play a small role in spreading influenza while others, such as unit clerks, play a much larger role.
Keywords: Influenza vaccine; social networks; vaccine subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://archive.fordham.edu/ECONOMICS_RESEARCH/PAP ... r_polgreen_segre.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:frd:wpaper:dp2009-07
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Fordham Economics Discussion Paper Series from Fordham University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Fordham Economics ().