A Comparison of Alternative Procedures for the Selection of the Private Partner in PPP Projects

Nicola Doni (nicola.doni@unifi.it)

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: In this work we compare three alternative procedures aimed at selecting a private partner in PPP projects: i.e. negotiation, auction and competitive negotiation. We show how the suitability of each of these selection mechanisms depends on many economic and institutional factors: e.g. the extent of contractual complexity, the degree of heterogeneity in firm costs, the level of competition, the probability of corruption. The main lesson of the paper is that the adoption of competitive negotiation can improve public welfare only if the institutional framework can ensure both an actual contestability of each contract and a low risk of corruption phenomena.

Keywords: Auctions; Negotiation; Information Policy; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D73 D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2007_10

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