Can't Touch This! Similarity And The Willingness to Keep "Dirty Money"
Sebastian Goerg,
David Johnson () and
Jonathan Rogers
No wp2014_03_01, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Florida State University
Abstract:
Traditionally, allocations by dictators in Dictator Games (gifts) have been explained by aspects of altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. However, this assumes the gift to be desirable to the dictators and responder. Giving may also be driven by the source of the endowment. We examine this by using three sources to generate the endowment in a Dictator Game:(1) undergraduate students, (2) Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, and (3) users of a racially/ethnically charged web forum. This endowment is provided to subjects in a traditional laboratory experiment. We find dictator similarity with the source of the endowment influences their allocation decision; the more similar subjects feel to the source the more of the endowment they keep. Our results suggest that decisions can be strongly influenced by the provider of income shocks.
Keywords: Experiment; Inequality; Approval (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 C99 D31 D64 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hpe
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https://coss.fsu.edu/econpapers/wpaper/wp2014_03_01.pdf First version, 2014-03 (application/pdf)
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Working Paper: Can't Touch This! Similarity And Willingness to Keep "Dirty Money" (2014) 
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