Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
George Mailath and
Stephen Morris
Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics
Abstract:
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to perfectly coordinate their behavior. Our study of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring focusses on the coordination problem that arises without public signals.
Keywords: GAME THEORY; COORDINATION MECHANISMS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (1998)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective'
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aunaec:349
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, RESEARCH SCHOOL of PACIFIC STUDIES, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, G.P.O. 4, CANBERRA ACT 2601 AUSTRALIA..O. BOX 4 CANBERRA 2601 AUSTRALIA.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel (krichel@openlib.org).