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Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective

George Mailath and Stephen Morris

Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics

Abstract: In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to perfectly coordinate their behavior. Our study of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring focusses on the coordination problem that arises without public signals.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; COORDINATION MECHANISMS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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