Sharing Nonconvex Costs

Igor Evstigneev and Sjur Flåm

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: The paper analyses cooperative games with side payments. Each player facesa possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggreagate members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation eliminates or reduces the lack of convexity. Core solutions are computed or approximated via dual programs associated to the grand coalition.

Keywords: COOPERATIVE GAMES; PRODUCTION GAMES; CORE ALLOCATIONS; LACK OF CONVEXITY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:1300

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