The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud

Georges Dionne ()

Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques.

Abstract: We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetric information problems on resource allocation. Two of them are retained: moral hazard and adverse selection.

Keywords: INFORMATION; MORAL HAZARD; INSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 D80 G11 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud (2000)
Working Paper: The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:etcori:00-04

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