The Economics of Location-Based Tax Incentives

Edward L. Glaeser

No 1932, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: Many local governments offer rich tax deals to firms to get these firms to come to their cities. In this brief essay, I review the economics of location-based tax incentives. I first address the positive economics of these incentives and present five theories of why these tax incentives occur. I then consider the normative aspects of these incentives and discuss the conditions under which these theories lead to optimal locations of firms and to optimal bundles of public goods. In general, I argue that tax incentives will generally lead to more efficient locational decisions. There may be undesirable redistributional consequences of these incentives, but these are best handled by national redistribution policy.

Date: 2001
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