Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm
T. Ichiishi and
Murat Sertel
ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)
Abstract:
The present paper proposes new concepts and a new scenario with which to analyze cooperative interim contracting and re-contracting in an organization.
Keywords: INFORMATION; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D80 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 1997
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Related works:
Chapter: Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm (2005)
Journal Article: Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm (1998)
Working Paper: Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:inecpu:161
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