Cost Manipulation in Oligopoly: A Duality Approach

Ngo Long and Antoine Soubeyran

ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)

Abstract: This paper analyzes a class of two-stage Cournot games where firms are collusive in the first stage, and shows that oligopolists may have a strong incentive to redistribute resources (such as capital, pollution permits, etc) within the industry as a means of coordinating their output decision.

Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES; GAMES; NATURAL RESOURCES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Cost Manipulation in Oligopoly: A Duality Approach (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:inecpu:174

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