Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria

Andrew McLennan () and In-Uck Park

Working Papers from Minnesota - Center for Economic Research

Abstract: The maximal generic number of Nash equilibria for two person games in which the two agents each have four pure strategies is shown to be 15. In contrast to Keiding (1995), who arrives at this result by computer enumeration, our argument is based on a collection of lemmas that constrain the set of equilibria. Several of these pertain to any common number d of pure strategies for the two agents.

Keywords: ECONOMETRICS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria (1999)
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