The Welfare Economics of Insurance Contracts that pay off by Reducing Price

John Nyman ()

Working Papers from Minnesota - Center for Economic Research

Abstract: The paper suggests that a portion of moral hazard is due to income transfers and that this portion of moral hazard should be excluded from the welfare loss Calculations. Only the portion of moral hazard that is due to the pure price effect has conventional welfare loss implications.

Keywords: INSURANCE; RISK (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:minner:308

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