Individual Moral Consistency and Aggregative Collective Choices

Nicolas Gravel (), Jean-François Laslier and Alain Trannoy

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: In this paper we propose a theory of individual moral consistency and we examine some consequences of this theory in particular contexts. Our notion of individual moral consistency is interpreted as a means for 'laundering' individula objectives that are amalgamated into collective judgements by a social aggregation function. Individual moral consistency is defined as the connection of each individual's objective function to exogenous moral principles in the ideal hypothetical situation whre all other individuals are ascribed the same objective function.

Keywords: UTILITY; FUNCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Individual moral consistency and aggregative collective choices (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9733

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