Group Lending, Repayment Incentives And Social Collateral

Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies

Keywords: bank loans; game theory; financial term; developing countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1991
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Journal Article: Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral (1995)
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