On the Sensitivity of Von Neuman and Moregenstern Abstract Stable Sets:The Stable and the Individual Stable Bargaining Set

Joseph Greenberg

Working Papers from Tilburg - Center for Economic Research

Keywords: econometrics; game theory; economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1991
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the sensitivity of von Neuman and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set (1993)
Journal Article: On the Sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern Abstract Stable Sets: The Stable and the Individual Stable Bargaining Set (1992)
Working Paper: On the sensitivity of Von Neuman and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: the stable and the individual stable bargaining set (1991)
Working Paper: On the sensitivity of Von Neuman and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: the stable and the individual stable bargaining set (1991)
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