Intergovernmental Grants As A Tactical Instrument: Some Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities

E. Johansson
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Eva Mörk ()

Working Papers from Uppsala - Working Paper Series

Abstract: Are grants to Swedish municipalities tactical? In this essay, I derive testable implications from a theoretical voting model and test these on a panel of 255 Swedish municipalities, 1981 - 1995. In order to decide which regions that are politically powerful, both election results, and survey data from the Swedish election studies are used. The results, although somewhat ambiguous, support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes.

Keywords: POLITICAL ECONOMY; MUNICIPALITIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: Intergovernmental Grants as a Tactical Instrument: Some Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:uppaal:1999:10

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