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On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments

Matz Dahlberg () and E. Johansson
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Eva Mörk ()

Working Papers from Uppsala - Working Paper Series

Abstract: A couple of months before the Swedish election in 1998, the incumbent government distributed 2.3 billion SEK to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities. This was the first wave of a four-year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development. This temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government. In this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters.

Keywords: ECONOMICS; VOTING; GOVERNMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H73 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (65)

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Journal Article: On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments (1999) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:uppaal:1999:24

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