US Aid for Israel – A Historical Overview

Konstantin Yanovskiy

Working Papers from Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy

Abstract: Historical data on US aid to Israel illustrates incentives of political leaders and special interests, first and foremost in Israel. As on the early stages of Alliance Israel military capabilities could provide valuable services to USA, undermining USSR influence in the Middle East, the current relations are hard to explain by mutual national interests. The paper focus on the political actors' personal incentives, provides explanation for growing exploitation of US Aid by the special interests in Israel, while significance of the aid is approaching to insignificant level and contributes negatively to the country Defense capacity because of political conditionality imposed. The data presented could support a new vision of US-Israel alliance: ceasing of the US Aid programs for Middle East could contribute both countries Defense needs.

Keywords: Political conditionality; Special interests; political leverage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 D78 F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2014, Revised 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cdm, nep-his and nep-pol
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https://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/wpaper/0090yanovskiy.pdf Revised version, 2013 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gai:wpaper:0090

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