Democracy: a Conflict Extinguisher or a Fuel for Terror?

Konstantin Yanovsky, Sergey Zhavoronkov and Ilia Zaycovetsky
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Konstantin Yanovsky: Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy
Ilia Zaycovetsky: Samuel Neaman Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Konstantin Moshe Yanovskiy

Working Papers from Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy

Abstract: Today’s exaggerated, deferent focus on democracy (the ability of voters by means of elections to change the government, to cause power rotation) has led to some overvaluations of the institutions associated with this type of government and their ability to cure society of all ills. Thus, some people recommend resolving acute violent conflicts (civil wars) by holding free elections. The present article studies two instances when attempts were made to entrench free elections in the absence of institutions formed in advance to protect persons and property. We have shown that in situations of violent conflict free elections may improve the position of the violence perpetrators – the roving bandits – at the cost of worsening the predicament of the population whom the bandits control. The instances considered lead to the question of the possibility in principle of constructing an effective democratic mechanism in the absence of minimal guarantees provided in advance to protect the lives and property of the voters.

Keywords: Democracy; violent conflict; bandit competition; basic individual rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2014, Revised 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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https://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/wpaper/0100Zhavoronkov.pdf Revised version, 2014 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gai:wpaper:0100

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