How to Control Civil Servants: Designing and Testing a Solution Informed by Game Theory

A. Georges L. Romme, Harry van de Loo and Ben Dankbaar
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A. Georges L. Romme: Department of Industrial Engineering and Innovation Sciences, Eindhoven University of Technology, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
Harry van de Loo: Dutch Institute for Management and Administration, 6584 AE Molenhoek, The Netherlands
Ben Dankbaar: Institute for Management Research, Radboud University Nijmegen, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Administrative Sciences, 2022, vol. 12, issue 2, 1-17

Abstract: A fundamental challenge in democracy is how to control civil service organizations. This challenge has been primarily addressed by creating horizontal accountability arrangements, in which independent agencies act as auditors and evaluators of civil service organizations. However, horizontal accountability only partially resolves this control challenge. In this paper, we adopt a design science approach and draw on insights from game theory to develop a set of design principles for controlling civil service organizations. Based on these design principles, a system for controlling civil service staff was created and implemented in a medium-sized Dutch municipality. The results obtained in this municipality are rather promising regarding the enhanced efficiency and transparency of the civil service organization, while the high level of job satisfaction among civil servants is sustained. These findings suggest that the benefits of increased transparency in how civil servants are monitored appear to outweigh the fact that they may have less discretion in their work.

Keywords: civil service; control; performance management; public administration; game theory; design science (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L M M0 M1 M10 M11 M12 M14 M15 M16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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