A Policy Effect Analysis of China’s Energy Storage Development Based on a Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Model

Ting Zhang, Shuaishuai Cao, Lingying Pan and Chenyu Zhou
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Ting Zhang: Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China
Shuaishuai Cao: Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China
Lingying Pan: Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China
Chenyu Zhou: Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China

Energies, 2020, vol. 13, issue 23, 1-35

Abstract: Energy storage technology plays a significant role in the pursuit of the high-quality development of the electricity market. Many regions in China have issued policies and regulations of different intensities for promoting the popularization of the energy storage industry. Based on a variety of initial conditions of different regions, this paper explores the evolutionary process of electricity market players considering energy storage technology. The trilateral evolutionary game model is adopted to analyze the strategies of the power plant, the power grid, and the government. After assigning the model according to an actual situation, each equilibrium point corresponds to a real electricity market situation. The results indicate the following: (1) In the process of stabilizing, the role of “Advanced Imitators” leading the strategy of building energy storage changes between the power plant and the power grid. (2) In Eastern, Middle, and Southern China, the power plants and power grids on a greater-than-medium scale will choose to build energy storage without governmental regulations, due to the abundant net profit. (3) In the northeast of China, power plants with a medium-or-lower scale will choose not to build energy storage because of the relatively low on-grid price, and small power grids can make enough profits by operating energy storage facilities. (4) In Northern China, the large power plants and the medium power grids will choose to build energy storage due to the high electricity sale price and the resulting high profit. (5) In Western China, the small power plants and power grids cannot afford to build energy storage due to the low electricity price. The results lead to valuable policy suggestions for the local governments of China in promoting energy storage in the future. To meet the goal of energy storage popularization, regional electricity market plans need relevant policies based on its existing conditions, offering suitable external conditions for adding energy storage.

Keywords: energy storage; China’s regional electricity market; evolutionary game model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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