Charging and Discharging Scheduling for Electrical Vehicles Using a Shapley-Value Approach

Marija Zima-Bockarjova, Antans Sauhats, Lubov Petrichenko and Roman Petrichenko
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Marija Zima-Bockarjova: ABB Corporate Research Center, 5405 Baden-Dättwil, Switzerland
Antans Sauhats: Institute of Power Engineering, Riga Technical University (RTU), LV-1658 Riga, Latvia
Lubov Petrichenko: Institute of Power Engineering, Riga Technical University (RTU), LV-1658 Riga, Latvia
Roman Petrichenko: Institute of Power Engineering, Riga Technical University (RTU), LV-1658 Riga, Latvia

Energies, 2020, vol. 13, issue 5, 1-21

Abstract: The number of electric vehicles (EV) in the world has been increasing and is gaining momentum. The large-scale use of EVs in public life has initiated the need to establish EV battery charging services within the power system. Currently, EVs serve as a transportation tool and also as a flexible load. This publication examines the possibility of the owner of an electric vehicle choosing a battery recharging point, as well as of the involvement of several decision makers in the selection of a charging schedule. This problem is important because we assume that a significant proportion of EVs mainly use two parking spaces, one located close to the place of residence and another close to the workplace. We accept and prove that a car charging station can be created by the employer (company) and implemented in the best interests of the employer and the employee (EV owner). For that, a coalition between the company and the EV owner has to be formed. To support rational decisions, this study solves the problem using the cooperative game theory and designs a payment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley value. The results obtained prove that the coalition is beneficial under different conditions, which depend on the capacity of the EV, the distance between the workplace and the place of residence, the difference in the electricity prices of the day, as well as the consumption of the company. In order to estimate the coalition’s gain, it is necessary to take into account the structure of the power tariff system for both the company and the EV owner. Furthermore, we prove that the presence of a coalition allows the company and the EV owner to reduce the annual fee for consumed power. The results of this analysis could be adopted by decision makers such as government agencies, companies, EV owners, and they are recommended for potential investors for the development of transport electrification and smart energy.

Keywords: electric vehicles; Shapley value; battery charging; optimization; coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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