Stackelberg-Game-Based Demand Response for Voltage Regulation in Distribution Network with High Penetration of Electric Vehicles

Linglei Xu, Qiangqiang Xie, Liang Zheng, Yongzhu Hua, Lihuan Shao and Jiadong Cui
Additional contact information
Linglei Xu: Yueqing Innovation Institute, Wenzhou Institute of Hangzhou Dianzi University, Wenzhou 325038, China
Qiangqiang Xie: Yueqing Innovation Institute, Wenzhou Institute of Hangzhou Dianzi University, Wenzhou 325038, China
Liang Zheng: The College of Electronics and Information, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou 310018, China
Yongzhu Hua: Yueqing Innovation Institute, Wenzhou Institute of Hangzhou Dianzi University, Wenzhou 325038, China
Lihuan Shao: The College of Electronics and Information, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou 310018, China
Jiadong Cui: The College of Electronics and Information, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Energies, 2022, vol. 15, issue 10, 1-13

Abstract: With the development of the economy, electricity demand continues to increase, and the time for electricity consumption is concentrated, which leads to increasing pressure on the voltage regulation of the distribution network. For example, a large number of electric vehicles charging during a low-price period may cause the problem of under-voltage of the distribution network. On the other hand, the penetration of distributed power generation of renewable energy may cause over-voltage problems in the distribution network. This study proposes a Stackelberg game model between the distribution system operator and the load aggregator. In the Stackelberg game model, the distribution system operator affects the users’ electricity consumption time by issuing subsidies to decrease the frequency of voltage violations. As the representative of users, the load aggregator helps the users schedule the demand during the subsidized period to maximize profits. Case studies are carried out on the IEEE 33-bus power distribution system. The results show that the time of the subsidy can be optimized based on the Stackelberg game model. Both the distribution system operator and the load aggregator can obtain the optimal economic profits and then comprehensively improve the operating reliability and economy of the power distribution system.

Keywords: Stackelberg game; voltage control; flexible load; demand response; genetic algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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