Green Credit of China’s Coal Power Enterprises during Green Transformation: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Feng Cui, Chuanfeng Han, Pihui Liu and Minmin Teng ()
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Feng Cui: School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
Chuanfeng Han: School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
Pihui Liu: School of Management Engineering, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan 250101, China
Minmin Teng: School of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai 200090, China

Energies, 2022, vol. 15, issue 16, 1-20

Abstract: China’s green credit has mostly been invested in new energy areas with positive environmental externalities in recent years, while coal power enterprises have been neglected. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among government, coal power enterprises, and banks to clarify the key factors and mechanisms for coal power enterprises undergoing green transformation. The research results show that: Firstly, to realize the spontaneous green transformation of coal power enterprises, spontaneous profitability must be achieved before the removal of policy incentives, which is reflected in the continuous increase in electricity price, carbon emission trading price, and decrease in green transformation cost. Secondly, the green credit adjustment factor cannot determine whether a company chooses to undertake green transition, but it provides a valuable window of green transition for companies. When the relative benefits of green transformation projects are greater than the relative costs, coal power enterprises will undergo green transformation spontaneously. Thirdly, lower green credit interest rates are not better. An optimal green credit interest rate exists, that allows coal power enterprises to obtain the longest transition window in which to achieve spontaneous profitability for green transition projects.

Keywords: coal power enterprises; green transformation; carbon emission reduction; green credit; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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