Modeling and Comparative Analysis of Multi-Agent Cost Allocation Strategies Using Cooperative Game Theory for the Modern Electricity Market

Smita Shandilya, Zdzislaw Szymanski, Shishir Kumar Shandilya, Ivan Izonin and Krishna Kant Singh
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Smita Shandilya: Department of Electrical and Electronics, Sagar Institute of Research and Technology, Bhopal 462041, India
Zdzislaw Szymanski: Department of Management, University of Social Sciences, 03-815 Lodz, Poland
Shishir Kumar Shandilya: School of Computing Science and Engineering, VIT Bhopal University, Bhopal 466114, India
Ivan Izonin: Department of Artificial Intelligence, Lviv Polytechnic National University, 79013 Lviv, Ukraine
Krishna Kant Singh: Faculty of Engineering & Technology, Jain (Deemed-to-be University), Bengaluru 560069, India

Energies, 2022, vol. 15, issue 7, 1-14

Abstract: The electrical market scenario has changed drastically in the last decade. In the presence of increased competition and less tolerant players, more sophisticated methods are required to balance the diversity and differential pricing while promoting cooperation among the agents. In the monopolistic environment, the central utility incurred the total cost of the transmission expansion. But as the current scenario demands, there are several public and private market players. The growth will benefit all the players, so the total cost in transmission expansion can be divided among players as per the benefit received by each player. In this paper, a transmission system expansion planning problem in the cooperative environment using cooperative game theory (CGT) is framed for the power sector, in which various players can cooperate in a coordinated manner to maximize their benefit but ultimately strengthen the power grid. In this paper, we have modeled, analyzed and compared various cost allocation methods of cooperative game theory specifically for the cost allocation in a transmission expansion planning problem. The present work focuses on forming coalitions to calculate the costs using the forward search and frog leap optimization approach. We have compared the SCRB, BSV, ENSC, and ACA methods for transmission expansion planning while attempting to satisfy the axioms. We have also observed that bilateral Shapely value efficiently allocated the costs due to its decentralized approach and the sequencing of coalition formations to achieve the best possible cost allocations.

Keywords: transmission expansion planning; cooperative game theory; graver bus system; game playing; deregulated electricity market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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