With Potential Games, Which Outcome Is Better?

Santiago Guisasola and Donald Saari
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Santiago Guisasola: Instituto Nacional de Matemática Pura e Aplicada, Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22460-320, Brazil
Donald Saari: Department of Mathematics, University of California, Irvine, CA 92617, USA

Games, 2020, vol. 11, issue 3, 1-20

Abstract: Lower one- or two-dimensional coordination, or potential games, are popularly used to model interactive behavior, such as innovation diffusion and cultural evolution. Typically, this involves determining the “better” of competing solutions. However, examples have demonstrated that different measures of a “good” choice can lead to conflicting conclusions; a fact that reflects the history of game theory in equilibrium selection. This behavior is totally explained while extending the analysis to the full seven-dimensional class of potential games, which includes coordination games.

Keywords: potential games; social welfare; risk dominance; payoff dominance; innovation diffusion; externalities; decomposition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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